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1. Summary 
Details of the proposed changes to higher education (HE) have been finalised ahead of 
tomorrow’s vote in the House of Commons on the raising of the cap on tuition fees to 
£9,000. We find that: 
 Lining up graduates according to their lifetime earnings, the Government’s proposals 
appear more progressive than the current system or that proposed by Lord Browne. The 
highest earning graduates would pay more on average than both the current system and 
that proposed by Lord Browne, while lower earning graduates would pay back less. 
 Lining up graduates according to their parents’ income, graduates from the poorest 30% 
of households would pay back less, on average, than under Lord Browne’s proposed 
system, but more, on average, than under the current system. While all graduates from 
families with incomes above this would pay more, graduates from the 6th and richest 
(10th) deciles of parental income would pay back the most under the proposed system. 
 The Government announced today that it will up-rate the threshold above which 
graduates pay back their loan annually in line with earnings (as was proposed by Lord 
Browne) rather than at 5 year intervals, which makes the system more progressive than 
originally proposed. 
 The National Scholarship fund – through which the taxpayer will cover the third year of 
fees for students from low income families who attend universities charging over £6,000 
a year – will cost the government money in the short term. But we estimate that in the 
long term the net impact will be to slightly strengthen the public finances slightly (by 
around £11m a year) if universities charge £7,500 per year. This is mainly because 
universities will be required to cover the cost of fees for these students in their first year, 
thereby reducing the taxpayer subsidy. 
 The new system is less transparent than the current system and that proposed by Lord 
Browne, with a more complex system of student support and interest rates. The new 
system also generates perverse incentives: the proposed National Scholarship fund, for 
example, provides a financial incentive for universities charging over £6,000 a year to 
turn away students from poorer backgrounds. 
 
2. Introduction 
Details of the proposed changes to higher education (HE) have been finalised ahead of 
tomorrow’s vote in the House of Commons on the raising of the cap on tuition fees to 
£9,000. The proposals form the Government’s response to the recommendations of the 
Browne Review.1 While the Government accepts a substantial part of the review’s 
recommendations, including an increase in fees and the repayment threshold, it has put 
                                                     
1 Source:  http://hereview.independent.gov.uk/hereview/report/  
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forward alternative proposals for student support and interest rates that are more 
progressive with respect to lifetime graduate earnings, but also more complex, less 
transparent, more administratively burdensome and more likely to result in perverse 
incentives. This Briefing Note supersedes previous analysis by IFS researchers of the 
implications of the proposed reforms to student finance. 
The key differences compared with Lord Browne’s proposals are: 
 Tighter means testing of grants, which saves the taxpayer money. 
 A fee cap of £9,000 but with no levy on fees above £6,000. The levy was intended to 
recoup the cost to government of providing larger loans to cover these fees; without it, 
the cost to the taxpayer is higher than under Lord Browne’s recommendations. 
 Increasing the interest rate for higher earning graduates and reducing it for lower 
earning graduates, via the proposed interest rate taper (see Table 1 below). Graduates 
earning above £32,000 (in 2012 prices) will face a higher interest rate than under Lord 
Browne’s recommendations, while graduates earning between £18,840 and £32,000 will 
face a lower interest rate. 
 Making the maintenance loan system more complex without any significant savings to 
the taxpayer, compared to Lord Browne’s proposals.  
 The announcement of an £150 million National Scholarship to fund a free third year’s 
tuition for an estimated 18,000 students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds. The 
same students will also be eligible for free tuition in the first year of their studies if they 
attend a university charging more than £6,000 a year: the cost of this subsidy will be met 
by the institution itself. We estimate that in the long run this feature of the scholarship 
could result in the Government actually saving money overall, by reducing the total 
amount of fee loans the Government must issue.  
 
3. Comparing the key features of the current and proposed systems 
Before we analyse the impact of the government’s proposals, it is important to outline how 
key parameters differ – in 2012 prices – under the current system, the system proposed by 
Lord Browne, and the system proposed by the Government.  
All analysis assumes that the £15,000 repayment threshold currently in place will be indexed 
to inflation from September 2012. In this note we also show the implications of continuing 
to freeze this threshold in nominal terms, as has been the case since 2006. In all our analysis, 
we compare the Government’s proposals to the current system both with and without 
inflation indexation of the threshold, in order to make clear the implications of the 
Governments announcement today to up-rate the £15,000 threshold with inflation from 
2012.  
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Table 1. Details of the current system and proposals (figures in 2012 prices)* 
 
Current (2010 system) Browne Review Government 
TUITION FEES 
£3,470 per year 
1
 Uncapped Up to £9,000 pa  
SUPPORT 
   MAINTENANCE GRANT £2,990 per year if 
parental income less 
than £25,000 pa; 
tapered to zero if 
parental income less 
than £50,000 pa 
£3,340 per year if 
parental income less 
than £25,000 pa; 
tapered to zero if 
parental income less 
than £62,500 pa 
£3,340 per year if 
parental income less 
than £25,000 pa; 
tapered to zero if 
parental income less 
than £42,500 pa 
MAINTENANCE LOAN £3,590 per year if 
parental income less 
than £25,000 pa; 
increasing to a maximum 
of £5,060 per year if 
parental income equal to 
£50,000 pa; decreasing 
to £3,750 per year if 
parental income equal to 
£60,000; £3,750 per year 
for parental incomes 
equal to and above 
£60,000 pa 
£3,850 per year  £3,980 per year if 
parental income less 
than £25,000 pa; 
increasing to a maximum 
of £5,620 per year if 
parental income equal to 
£42,500 pa; decreasing 
to £3,670 per year if 
parental income equal to 
£62,500; £3,670 per year 
for parental incomes 
equal to and above 
£62,500 pa 
BURSARY University pays a 
minimum of £350 per 
year if student receives 
full maintenance grant 
  
SCHOLARSHIP 
  
University pays full first 
year fee if fees exceed 
£6,000 pa and student 
from FSM
2
 background 
Government pays full 
third year fee if fees 
exceed £6,000 pa and 
student is from FSM 
background 
FEE AND MAINTENANCE LOAN REPAYMENT 
  REAL INTEREST RATE 
   during study 0% 2.2% 3% 
after graduation 
0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% if graduate is 
earning less than 
repayment threshold. 
Between 0 and 2.2% if 
graduate does not earn 
enough to cover full 
interest payment. 2.2% 
at earnings above this  
0% if graduate is earning 
less than repayment 
threshold. Tapered 
between 0% at threshold 
and 3% if graduate is 
earning £36,780. 3% if 
earning above £36,780 
REPAYMENT RATE 9% 9% 9% 
REPAYMENT THRESHOLD £15,000 £18,840 £18,840 
UPRATING OF 
THRESHOLD 
Annually with inflation 
from 2012 
Annually with earnings 
from 2016 
Annually with earnings 
from 2016  
REPAYMENT PERIOD 25 years 30 years 30 years 
*under the current system, all figures for grants and loans are assumed to be frozen to 2011 and then inflated by 1 year to 
2012(RPI).Fees are up-rated by 2 years RPI  1Average fee charged is £3,290 2Receives free school meals  
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We now draw out some of the implications derived from Table 1.  
Fees 
The largest single announcement was a cap on annual tuition fees of £9,000 per year (which 
was not recommended by Lord Browne). In return for preventing universities from charging 
more than this, the Government will not impose a levy on fees above £6,000 per year. 
Instead, universities wishing to charge more than this will be required to intensify their 
efforts to widen participation in collaboration with the Office for Fair Access. Universities 
would be free to charge less than £6,000 a year, but are unlikely to do so as on average, they 
would need to charge £7,000 a year just to replace the lost income from teaching grants.  
Upfront Support for Students 
The announcements included changes to the package of upfront support currently received 
by students. Students from the poorest families (with household income at or below 
£25,000) will be better off, in terms of upfront support, by around £750 per year compared 
with the current system. This is due to increases in the generosity of maintenance grants and 
loans. The government will save money by cutting maintenance grants back for those from 
higher income families – the maximum parental income at which a grant is payable has been 
reduced to £42,600 (currently £50,000 and proposed to be £60,000 by Browne). Overall, the 
total amount of upfront support is more generous than the Browne recommendations for 
student with household incomes below £37,500 and less generous for students with 
household incomes above this. 
Contrary to Lord Browne’s welcome recommendation of a universal maintenance loan, the 
current system of means-tested maintenance loans will continue, with a series of 
complicated tapers to determine the amount of support payable in the form of grants and 
loans.  
Maintenance grants of £3,340 a year and maintenance loans of £3,980 a year will be payable 
to all students from households with annual income up to £25,000. Those with household 
incomes above this amount will then see the loan element of their support package increase 
and the grant element decrease with income, until household income reaches £42,600. Then 
as household incomes increase above £42,600, the total amount of support payable (purely 
in the form of loans) decreases until household income reaches £62,125. At and beyond this 
household income level a universal maintenance loan of £3,670 will apply. These changes 
will significantly increase the administrative burden of applying for and administering loans 
compared to Lord Browne’s proposal. While there is a strong case for making upfront 
support for students relate to parental income, it is much harder to argue that graduate debt 
and therefore future graduate contributions should be related to parental income before 
studying rather than just the course taken and how well graduates do in the labour market. 
In particular it is difficult to justify why students from households earning £42,600 should 
face larger debts than all other students doing similarly-priced courses. Whilst the proposed 
system is more progressive than the current system and Lord Browne’s proposals, the details 
of the proposed system are quite complex and less transparent than the system proposed by 
Lord Browne (a universal maintenance loan and means-tested grant). This was also 
progressive but less complex system, and therefore merits reconsideration. 
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Bursaries and scholarships 
As well as introducing changes to maintenance grants and loans, the announcements also 
include changes to upfront support in the form of bursaries and scholarships. Under the 
current system, universities must award a bursary of at least £350 per year to students from 
poor backgrounds (defined as those who receive a full maintenance grant). In practise, the 
bursary system is less than transparent, with many universities and colleges offering 
considerably more than the minimum and often to those with parental incomes higher than 
the minimum required for a full grant2. Both Lord Browne and the government agree that 
the bursary system should be scrapped. This move will simplify the application process for 
students, since they will no longer have to apply to both the university and the government 
to obtain their minimum level of support, though universities may still continue to operate 
their own bursary systems.  
The Government has also proposed a new National Scholarship fund specifically aimed at 
poorer students. Under the scheme, universities that charge over £6,000 per year in tuition 
fees will be required to cover the full amount of the first year’s fee for any student in receipt 
of free school meals (FSM). If the student stays in university until the third year, the 
government will cover the full value of his/her third year’s fee, so those qualifying for the 
award will receive up to £18,000 depending on the fee set by the university they attend. 
The aim of this scholarship is to ensure that higher tuition fees do not dissuade students 
from poor backgrounds from applying to universities that decide to charge fees over £6,000, 
and the scholarship may well have this effect. However there are a number of other 
implications resulting from this scheme. Most obviously, a student from a low-income 
background who studies at a university charging £6,000 (or below) will have to two years’ 
fee loans, yet a similar student at a university charging £6,001 (or more) will only have to 
borrow one year’s fee loan. This discrepancy could clearly distort the choices that students 
would otherwise make between different universities. 
Universities that typically attract a high proportion of FSM students may be dissuaded from 
charging fees above £6,000 since they will have to meet the cost of a year’s fee for each FSM 
student, or may turn away applicants from FSM backgrounds to avoid having to meet the 
cost of a year’s funding, which would be an undesirable implication of the system. 
Another issue is that the scholarship creates large incentives for households to manipulate 
their reported total income in order to qualify for it, because of the ‘cliff-edge’ in the 
eligibility rule. If the family income is just low enough to make the student eligible for FSM, 
then the student is also eligible for one (or two) year’s free tuition. If the family income is 
marginally higher, the student will not be eligible. Parents with higher incomes will therefore 
have in incentive to reduce their reported level of gross income in some way. 
                                                     
2
 In 2008/09 the typical bursary for a student receiving the full Maintenance Grant on a 
course charging full tuition fees was £890 (www.direct.gov.uk). 
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Finally, it is likely that the scholarship system will provide an additional administrative 
burden to the government, universities and students themselves, who will presumably have 
to apply directly to the university to receive their scholarship. 
Graduate Repayments 
 
There are important changes elsewhere. The Government proposes a higher maximum 
interest rate and a different way of tapering it than that proposed by Lord Browne. Instead 
of a capped real interest rate for lower-earning graduates to ensure that their debt does not 
increase in real terms, there would be a real interest rate applied linearly over the salary 
scale, from 0% at £18,840 a year (in 2012 prices) to a maximum of 3% at £36,780 (in 2012 
prices). 
 
While the maximum interest rate is higher than under Lord Browne’s proposals, this taper is 
more progressive: new graduates earning between £18,840 and roughly £32,000 a year 
would face a lower rate of interest.  
The prospect of a real interest rate has led to concerns about whether graduates from 
wealthy families may repay their loans more rapidly in order to reduce their total interest 
payment. In response to this, the Government has proposed an early repayment levy to 
discourage individuals (particularly high-earners) from making extra payments. While higher 
interest rates will increase the incentive to make larger repayments, the terms of the loan 
remain more generous than alternative commercially available sources of finance. This 
means that graduates are actually likely to be worse off anyway if they attempt to repay 
their loan faster. Nevertheless, for those facing a 3% real interest rate, the Government 
benefits more if these graduates take longer to pay their debt back, hence it also has a fiscal 
incentive to discourage early repayments from these graduates. 
4. Who are the winners and losers from the Government’s proposals? 
Compared to the system proposed by Lord Browne, universities are the main winners: the 
absence of a levy enables them to keep 100% of any additional fee income above the basic 
£6,000 level (from students not receiving free school meals). This more than outweighs the 
likely costs to universities of having to provide a year’s free tuition to students from the 
poorest backgrounds. The main loser of the Government’s proposed system – relative to the 
one proposed by Lord Browne – is itself: the reduction in maintenance grants is more than 
outweighed by the cost of not imposing a levy. Rather than being compensated by 
universities for any losses from unpaid loans, the Government will have to meet the cost 
itself. 
Table 2 summarises the balance of contributions to the cost of higher education under the 
current system, the Browne Review recommendations and the Government’s proposals. The 
figures presented are total amounts per graduate over the course of their degree. 
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Table 2. Balance of contributions to higher education under current, Browne Review, and 
Government scenarios 
 Current 
System 
(no up-
rating) 
Current 
System 
(up-rating 
by RPI) 
Govt. 
(£7,500 
fee) 
Change 
from 
Current 
(up-rating 
by RPI) 
Change 
from 
Browne 
Govt. 
(£9,000 
fee) 
Change 
from 
Current  
(up-rating 
by RPI) 
Change 
from 
Browne 
Source of funding (per graduate) 
Taxpayers: £21,820 £22,290 £16,750 -£5,540 £1,820 £18,950 -£3,340 £3,810 
HEFCE £12,320 £12,320 £2,430 -£9,900 £0 £2,430 -£9,900 £0 
Grant £4,270 £4,270 £4,520 £250 -£1,030 £4,520 £250 -£1,030 
RAB £5,220 £5,690 £9,800 £4,120 £2,840 £12,000 £6,320 £4,830 
RAB % 24.5 26.7 28.1   30.6   
         
Graduates: £16,080 £15,620 £25,020 £9,400 -£150 £27,200 £11,580 -£70 
  Fee loans £6,670 £6,350 £14,240 £7,890 -£360 £16,420 £10,070 -£280 
  
Maintenance 
loans £9,420 £9,270 
 
 
£10,780 £1,510 £210 £10,780 £1,510 £210 
Destination of funding (per graduate) 
Universities: £21,780 £21,780 £24,340 £2,570 £1,480 £28,720 £6,950 £3,560 
  HEFCE £12,320 £12,320 £2,430 -£9,900 £0 £2,430 -£9,900 £0 
  Fees £9,770 £9,770 £21,920 £12,150 £1,490 £26,300 £16,530 £3,560 
  Bursary -£320 -£320 £0 £320 £0 £0 £320 £0 
         
Students: £16,130 £16,130 £17,420 £1,290 £170 £17,420 £1,290 £170 
  Grants £4,270 £4,270 £4,520 £250 -£1,030 £4,520 £250 -£1,030 
  
Maintenance 
loans £11,540 £11,540 £12,910 £1,370 £1,210 £12,910 £1,370 £1,210 
  Bursary £320 £320 £0 -£320 £0 £0 -£320 £0 
 
What are the implications for graduates? 
The Government’s proposed system has the feature that potential debt upon graduation will 
depend upon a student’s family income, both because of the National Scholarship but also 
because of the maintenance loan schedule. This question is therefore best addressed by 
examining graduate repayments both by graduate earnings and by parental income. Clearly 
who is better or worse off relative to the current system depends on whether the repayment 
threshold would have been up-rated with inflation or not. The graphs below enable both 
comparisons to be made. 
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Figure 1. Total repayments by graduate income level (£7,500 fee) 
 
 
We see from Figure 1 that graduates in the bottom two deciles (on average) are better off 
than under the current system regardless of how the current repayment threshold is 
indexed. Across all graduates, we calculate that 24.3% of graduates would be better off 
compared to the current system assuming no up-rating of the current £15,000 threshold; 
while 22.9% would be better off if the current threshold was linked to inflation (see Table 3). 
This is because fixing the current threshold in cash terms makes it less generous to 
graduates, and therefore makes other policy options seem relatively more generous in 
comparison. Nevertheless, the Government’s proposed system is more progressive among 
graduates than both the current system and the one recommended by the Browne Review. 
The highest earning graduates (those in the top two deciles) would pay more on average 
than under the proposals made by Lord Browne, while graduates in the other income groups 
would pay back less.  
If we instead examine the implications of the proposed reforms by students’ parental 
income, we see that the proposed system including the scholarship enables graduates from 
the poorest 30% of households to pay less, on average, than under Lord Browne’s system, 
but still significantly more, on average, than under the current system. This is because while 
overall debt for students with a scholarship will be slightly lower than under the current 
system, repayments will be still be higher because of the increase in interest rates. 
Interestingly, graduates coming from the 6th decile of family income pay back the most, on 
average, because they receive the highest maintenance loans and are not eligible for any 
support from the National Scholarship. Under Lord Browne’s proposal, graduate repayments 
increase slightly by decile of parental income, which contrasts with the peaks at the 6th and 
10th deciles under the Government’s proposals. This somewhat perverse distributional effect 
could have been avoided if the Government had adopted the Browne Review’s simpler and 
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more transparent recommendations: a universal maintenance loan of the same value to all 
students, with a means-tested grant providing the progressively-targeted student support. 
Figure 2. Total repayments by parental income level (£7,500 fee) 
 
 
Both the Government’s and Lord Browne’s proposals ensure that graduates in the bottom 
20% to 25% of graduate lifetime earnings are actually better off than under the current 
system (see Table 3). All other graduates are worse off than under the current system. For 
around half of graduates, the proposed system is effectively a 30-year graduate tax (as 
shown in Table 4): these individuals will simply pay 9% of their earnings above the 
repayment threshold for 30 years and then have the rest of their loan written off. One key 
difference compared with the recommendations made by Lord Browne is that under the 
Government’s proposals, around 10% of graduates would pay back more than they 
borrowed (see Table 5). This is due to the proposed 3% maximum interest rate, which 
exceeds the Government’s discount rate of 2.2%. 
Table 3. Proportion of graduates who pay back less than under current system 
(under a £7,500 fee) 
 Current with no 
up-rating of 
threshold 
Current with RPI 
up-rating of 
threshold 
Browne proposals 24.5% 23.1% 
Government proposals 24.4% 23.2% 
 
Table 4. Proportion of graduates who have some debt written off 
 £7,500 fee £9,000 fee 
Browne proposals 51.5% 57.1% 
Government proposals 48.7% 54.8% 
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Table 5. Proportion of graduates who pay back more than they borrowed 
 £7,500 fee £9,000 fee 
Browne proposals 0.6% 0.5% 
Government proposals 9.2% 10.7% 
 
5. Comments 
The proposed government system is progressive compared to both the current system and 
that proposed by Lord Browne when looking at repayments across the distribution of 
graduate lifetime earnings. When looking at repayments across the distribution of parental 
income, the system is more progressive than the current system and that proposed by Lord 
Browne for the bottom 6 deciles. Graduates from the bottom decile of parental income 
distribution benefit significantly more than graduates in higher deciles because of the 
operation of the scholarship. However, because of the complicated maintenance loan 
system described earlier, the proposed system is not progressive throughout the top 4 
deciles of parental income. This is also the case with the current system. Lord Browne 
avoided this by having a universal maintenance loan with all the progressivity of the student 
support system achieved through the grant. The complexity added by the Government saves 
it around £360 per student. This small saving could equally have been achieved via a small 
reduction in the universal maintenance loan proposed or some tweaking of the grant 
system; this would also have provided the additional benefit of greater transparency and a 
lower administrative burden. The Government’s decision to implement a different system of 
maintenance loans is therefore a lost opportunity. 
The aim of the scholarship is to ensure that higher tuition fees do not dissuade students 
from poor backgrounds from applying to universities that charge above £6,000; it also offers 
poorer students some additional protection if universities charge high fees. The scholarship 
may well achieve these ends and have a positive impact on participation compared to a 
system without a scholarship, if students are repelled by their perception of the higher fees. 
It allows students from the poorest backgrounds to have a ‘taster’ year of university without 
having to take out a fee loan. 
However there are a number of counter-intuitive (or even perverse) implications resulting 
from this scheme. While it does benefit poor students, it does not benefit poor graduates. 
The lowest earners are not affected by it as most of their debt is written off regardless; the 
benefit is greatest in the middle of the distribution of lifetime earnings. Most obviously, a 
student from a low-income background who studies at a university charging £6,000 (or 
below) will have to borrow the full fee amount for two years (up to £12,000) – while a 
student at a university charging £6,001 (or more) will have his/her fees covered for two 
years and only needs to borrow a maximum of £9,000 for fees (for a three-year degree). 
Given the Government’s emphasis on allowing student choice and fee variability to drive the 
higher education sector, it seems surprising to introduce a distortion into this quasi-market 
which would potentially make a degree at an oversubscribed, elite university cheaper than 
at a less prestigious one. 
 © Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010 
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This leads to a further issue: requiring universities to fund the first year of free tuition from 
their own income could impose significant costs upon universities, while saving the 
Government money. The Government does not have to issue a fee loan for this additional 
year that is provided for free, which reduces the associated loan subsidy (reflecting the 
expected costs of writing off the debt). Under a £7,500 fee, for example, the cohort of 
graduates would, as a whole, make £126 million less in repayments over their lifetime. 
However, the burden of this does not fall on the Government. Universities lose the full 
amount of the annual fee, which totals £137 million across the entire cohort of graduates. 
The difference of £11 million is actually a saving to the Government: it loses less from 
providing a year’s free tuition (because some of money, if loaned out, would not have been 
repaid anyway); moreover, this is outweighed by a larger saving that results from not having 
to issue fee loans for the additional year of free tuition. If all universities charge only £6,000 
then this issue does not arise as their liability to match-fund additional free tuition is not 
triggered; at the other extreme, if they charged £9,000 then they would lose £164 million of 
fee income, while the Government would actually benefit to the tune of £26 million. 
This re-introduces the undesirable feature of the bursary scheme (as outlined by Lord 
Browne): universities that attract a higher proportion of poorer students have to absorb 
additional costs compared to universities that attract a lower proportion (if they want to 
implement fees above £6,000). Given that the scholarship creates a large distortion in the 
higher education sector, as well as a financial incentive for high-status universities not to 
accept the poorest students, we think it would be better for the Government fund the 
additional year of free tuition itself. It could then claw back the money from the most 
expensive universities in ways that are not related to by the proportion of poor students 
they attract – for example, via a levy scheme similar to the one proposed by Lord Browne. 
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Appendix: Supplementary tables 
Table A.1 Implications of different fee levels for graduates 
Average 
fee 
Average 
NPV 
repayment 
Average 
number of 
years to 
repay 
Proportion 
with some 
debt written 
off 
Proportion 
repaying 
more than 
they borrow 
Proportion 
repaying less 
than under 
current system 
£6,000 £22,770 24.2 43.0% 7.7% 23.2% 
£7,000 £24,240 24.8 46.5% 8.7% 23.3% 
£7,500 £25,020 25.1 48.7% 9.2% 23.2% 
£8,000 £25,770 25.4 50.8% 9.8% 23.2% 
£8,500 £26,500 25.7 52.8% 10.2% 23.2% 
£9,000 £27,200 26.0 54.8% 10.7% 23.2% 
 
 
Table A.2 Implications of different fee levels for public finances 
Average fee 
RAB charge 
(%) 
RAB charge 
(£) per 
graduate 
Total RAB 
charge across all 
graduates 
Extra cost 
relative to 
£7,500 fee 
£6,000 25.7% £7,970 £2,906 million -£669 million 
£7,000 27.3% £9,120 £3,327 million -£248 million 
£7,500 28.1% £9,800 £3,575 million £0 
£8,000 29.0% £10,510 £3,833 million £258 million 
£8,500 29.8% £11,240 £4,101 million £525 million 
£9,000 30.6% £12,000 £4,378 million £802 million 
Note: Final two columns show costs per cohort of graduates. This is in principle indicative of 
the annual cost when the system is in a steady state. 
 
 
 
